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Abstract 21 
The snowdrift game is a model for studying social coordination in the context of competing interests. 22 
We presented pairs of chimpanzees with a situation in which they could either pull a weighted tray 23 
together or pull alone to obtain food.  Ultimately chimpanzees should coordinate their actions because 24 
if no one pulled, they would both lose the reward. There were two experimental manipulations: the 25 
tray's weight (low or high weight condition) and the time to solve the dilemma before the rewards 26 
became inaccessible (40 seconds or 10 seconds). When the costs were high (i.e high weight condition), 27 
chimpanzees waited longer to act. Cooperation tended to increase in frequency across sessions. The 28 
pulling effort invested in the task also became more skewed between subjects. The subjects also 29 
adjusted their behaviour by changing their pulling effort for different partners. These results 30 
demonstrate that chimpanzees can coordinate their actions in situations where there is a conflict of 31 
interest. 32 
Keywords: chimpanzees, conflict, cooperation, coordination, decision-making, snowdrift game. 33 
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Social species need to coordinate with others to benefit from living in a group. However, in many cases 36 
individuals have competing interests. For instance, chimpanzees (Boesch, 1994, 2002) and lions (Scheel 37 
& Packer, 1991) are more successful when they hunt and defend their territories as a group; but 38 
individuals may be tempted to lag behind to avoid potential costs (e.g., risk of injury) and benefit from 39 
others’ efforts (Gilby & Connor, 2010).  40 
Previous experimental studies have found that when individuals need to work together to retrieve food 41 
chimpanzees can coordinate their actions (Chalmeau, 1994; Cronin, Bridget, van Leeuwen, Mundry & 42 
Haun, 2013 Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis, Hare & Tomasello, 2006; Suchak, Eppley, Campbell & de Waal, 43 
2014). To a certain extent, chimpanzees can also coordinate their actions when there is an alternative 44 
(though lower-value) reward that can be obtained individually (Duguid, Wyman, Bullinger, Herfurth-45 
Majstorovic & Tomasello, 2014). Even when Melis, Hare and Tomasello (2009) introduced a conflict of 46 
interest by presenting chimpanzee pairs with a choice between two cooperative tasks, one with equal 47 
payoffs (3-3) and other with unequal payoffs (5-1), pairs still cooperated in the majority of trials.  In 48 
contrast, Bullinger, Melis and Tomasello (2011) found that chimpanzees preferred to work alone to 49 
obtain the same amount of food.  Their preference for solitary over social work, however, was reversed 50 
when the payoff of the social option was higher than the payoff of the solitary option. The subject’s 51 
preference for the non-social option suggests that they did not take into account their partner’s 52 
preference because the partner could not obtain the rewards by pulling alone. 53 
In previous studies that did not offer subjects an alternative non-social option (but see Bullinger et al., 54 
2011), subjects needed to cooperate with a partner to complete the task regardless of the payoff’s 55 
distribution (Melis et al., 2009) or time constraints (Duguid et al., 2014). However, in some situations 56 
such as group hunting, initiating the action and investing energy in a cooperative act  is not necessarily 57 
the best strategy from an individual’s perspective as it is a costly and risky action (Gilby & Connor, 2010). 58 
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Therefore, if a group member starts a hunt, others can benefit without actively participating and 59 
incurring the costs. However, if no one starts the hunt, they all lose the chance to get the prey. How can 60 
chimpanzees solve this dilemma? According to Boesch (2002), chimpanzees coordinate to take specific 61 
roles when initiating a hunt, providing a cooperative solution to the dilemma. However, chimpanzees 62 
may use other strategies when initiating the hunts. For instance Boesch (2002) reported that young 63 
chimpanzees tended to start the chase. This could be explained if we consider that young chimpanzees 64 
did not fully understand the contingencies of the hunting endeavour and therefore were willing to 65 
initiate it whereas more experienced chimpanzees lagged behind (see Tomasello, 2009). Similarly, a 66 
study by Gilby et al. (2015) found evidence that some chimpanzees, described as “impact-hunters”, are 67 
willing to pay the extra costs to begin the hunt, letting others join in when the risks are lower.    The 68 
dilemma faced by individuals in such situations is thus whether to initiate the action or not, given that if 69 
no-one initiates everyone loses out. In theory, each individual’s preference ranking should be that: (1) 70 
other begins, (2) I begin, (3) no one begins. Despite the observational work of previous studies (Boesch, 71 
2002; Gilby et al., 2015) there has been little experimental work studying how chimpanzees would 72 
behave in situations where a conflict of interest  is present (but see Schneider, Melis & Tomasello, 73 
2012).   74 
These types of interactions have been modelled by theorists in the snowdrift game (Doebeli & Hauer, 75 
2005; Kun, Boza & Scheuring, 2006; Sudgen, 1986). In the classic description of the snowdrift situation 76 
two cars become stranded on a highway that is covered with snow. The snow must be shovelled off the 77 
road before the drivers can return home. They could shovel the snow together and share the work, or 78 
alternatively, one driver could do it alone. Each driver would prefer that the other one do it. However, if 79 
one of them defects the other should shovel the snow, thus paying the costs to return home. So in the 80 
snowdrift dilemma, subjects have a common goal that can be either achieved by performing a 81 
cooperative act (either together or individually) or free-riding. Of course, it is in the interest of each 82 
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subject to defect and let the partner incur the cost but if neither pays the costs both lose. According to 83 
recent literature (Kun et al., 2006) chimpanzee hunting could be explained by applying the metaphor of 84 
the snowdrift game. Chimpanzees would prefer others to start the hunt unless no one else starts. In the 85 
latter case, as in the previous example, the chimpanzee would prefer to begin the hunt rather than let 86 
the monkey escape. So, unlike in the prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Maynard-Smith, 87 
1982) acting cooperatively can avoid the worst-case scenario as a cooperative act will always provide a 88 
benefit, even for the subject that carries out the costly action.  89 
Besides agent-based model studies, the snowdrift game has been empirically applied to study human 90 
strategic behaviour (Duffy & Feltovich, 2002; 2006; Kümmerli et al., 2007; Rapoport & Chammah, 1966). 91 
Overall, these studies have found that humans cooperate more when they are faced with a snowdrift 92 
game in comparison to the prisoner’s dilemma situation. However, as far as we know the snowdrift has 93 
not yet been used to study strategic decision-making in non-human primates.  94 
The aim of this study was to use the snowdrift model to investigate how chimpanzees solve a 95 
coordination task with a conflict of interest. We presented pairs of chimpanzees with a version of the 96 
snowdrift game in which they obtained food rewards by pulling a weighted tray towards them. They 97 
could either perform a cooperative act (pull the rope and do all the work or both pull and thus share the 98 
load) or one could free-ride while the other did the work. Importantly, chimpanzees were free to decide 99 
the amount of weight they pulled. Therefore, cooperation, defined by both individuals pulling during the 100 
same trial, could be skewed towards one subject depending on the efforts invested by each member of 101 
the dyad. In real-life situations, chimpanzees are able to vary their degree of investment by starting the 102 
chase, follow other individuals and join the chase or lag behind and reap the benefits from the hunt 103 
(Boesch, 2002; Gilby et al., 2015). For instance, in the case of hunting, chimpanzees could theoretically 104 
initiate the hunt but then let others do most of the work, although to our knowledge this has not been 105 
6 
empirically demonstrated. Therefore subjects are not only faced with a binomial decision (either 106 
cooperate or free-ride) as in previous cooperative games (Chalmeau, 1994; Duguid et al., 2014 Hirata & 107 
Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2006, 2009) but can adjust their actions by investing different amounts of effort 108 
(i.e. their speediness in chasing the monkey), allowing them to make precise decisions based on the 109 
physical contingencies and the partners’ actions.  In our task both subjects got the same amount of food 110 
as long as one individual pulled, so there was no need for cooperation. However, if neither pulled within 111 
a certain time-frame both lost the food. This set up reflects the payoffs of the 2-person snowdrift game 112 
where the best strategy for a chimpanzee was to wait for the partner to pull and obtain the benefit (b) 113 
but pay the cost of the action if the partner did not pull (b-c) to avoid losing the rewards if no one pulls 114 
(b = 0). At the same time, if both partners pull simultaneously, that results in an intermediate 115 
cooperative strategy where costs are divided (b-c/2). 116 
Importantly, although this set-up uses the same payoff matrix as behavioural economic experiments 117 
with adults, it differs from these studies in that chimpanzees in our task were not strangers and they 118 
were free to interact during the task. However, this set-up is more ecologically valid for chimpanzees 119 
because interactions with strangers are relatively rare and often aggressive; cooperation occurs 120 
between known group members (Boesch et al., 2008).  121 
Our main interests were whether chimpanzees a) would maximize their benefit (food – cost of pulling) 122 
by waiting for a partner to pull first, b)  would solve the task (get the food) by cooperating or free-riding, 123 
c) change their strategies with different partners. We manipulated weight and time to approximate the 124 
contingencies of chimpanzee hunting: the apes have to overcome the costs to initiate the action (the 125 
weight that they have to move) while the prey is only available for a limited time (the time limits). If 126 
chimpanzees acted strategically, we expected them to wait longer to pull when the costs of pulling the 127 
tray were high (i.e. it was heavy) and for one individual to free-ride more often (understood as not 128 
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pulling at all) while the other always pulled. In contrast, during low weight trials we expected 129 
chimpanzees to pay less attention to their partners’ actions and thus wait less to pull. We also expected 130 
chimpanzees to wait longer in long time trials as they would have more opportunity to free-ride 131 
compared to short time trials. Our study consisted of two phases: all subjects completed the test with 132 
one partner first before partners were re-shuffled for a second round. With this manipulation we could 133 
study the overall effect of experience and whether they were able to  adjust their actions to the 134 
behaviour of their partners as they should not only consider the physical contingencies of the task 135 
(weight and time) but also their partners’ decisions to maximize their rewards and coordinate their 136 
actions.   137 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 138 
Subjects 139 
We tested 7 female and 5 male captive chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes (Xage=23.4 ±13.8, range 9-39 years) 140 
housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center in Leipzig Zoo, Germany. In phase 1 of the 141 
study all 12 made up 6 unique pairings. In phase 2 10 of the 12 made up 5 new pairings. The 142 
experimental set-up required subjects to be in the same cage during testing. Consequently, we could 143 
only pair chimpanzees with a high degree of tolerance. Additionally, we paired them according to similar 144 
weight (as a proxy for strength). 145 
The task required subjects to obtain out-of-reach food rewards (one 4cm banana piece for each 146 
individual) by pulling on ropes to move a tray towards them (Fig. 1). Each subject had access to one of 147 
two ropes and the tray could be pulled with either one or both ropes. The weight of the tray (and thus 148 
the effort required to pull it in) could be adjusted by the experimenter. The weight (in kg) pulled by each 149 
individual was measured by two sets of scales that connected each of the ropes to the central weight. 150 
We recorded all measurements displayed on each of the scales for the duration of the trial with a digital 151 
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camera and averaged them for each individual per trial (see Appendix for further methodological 152 
details). 153 
A 1.09 meter mesh barrier split the tray into two equal parts ensuring that each subject could only 154 
access one rope and one side of the tray (with its corresponding food).  There were approximately 155 
another 1.5 meters between the end of the mesh barrier and the room’s back wall.  This means that 156 
subjects could still move around the room but they were unable to grab both their own and their 157 
partner’s rope / food simultaneously.  To reduce the likelihood that subjects would move around the 158 
barrier to steal from one another, trials were started when each chimpanzee was positioned in front of 159 
the apparatus on opposite sides of the mesh barrier (Fig. 1).  160 
The food rewards were placed in small bowls on either side of the apparatus and the bowls could be 161 
moved towards the edge of the tray by the experimenter pulling a nearly invisible piece of fishing line. 162 
Once the bowls reached the edge of the tray they fell, together with the food rewards, and became 163 
inaccessible (see Appendix for further methodological details).  164 
 165 
The training consisted of two parts. At first, each chimpanzee had to perform an individual training 166 
session to understand the physical contingencies of the apparatus. On the next testing day, pairs of 167 
chimpanzees that previously succeeded in the individual training performed a dyadic training session to 168 
understand and experience all three possible outcomes during the following test phase (see below). 169 
During both training sessions (individual and dyadic) only low weight was used to keep subjects 170 
motivated during the training sessions. However, experience with high weight was provided prior to 171 
starting with high weight sessions. 172 
 173 
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Individual training 174 
Each subject had to perform an individual training session composed of 8 trials: four long time trials 175 
where the food remained on a tray for 40 seconds (30 seconds in a static position on the tray + 10 176 
seconds moving towards the edges of the tray) and four short time trials where the food remained for 177 
10 seconds (constantly moving towards the edges of the tray from the beginning of the trial). These two 178 
time conditions were the same across all training and test sessions. Subjects had to pull 8 times to 179 
receive the rewards (both sides of the apparatus were baited). Each subject pulled four times (2 times 180 
per condition) from the right side of the apparatus and four from the left side. All conditions were 181 
randomised within the session (also during dyadic training and the test sessions). 182 
Dyadic training 183 
Each dyad completed one training session together. The session was composed of 12 trials: in four trials 184 
both subjects had access to their own rope; in the remaining 8 trials only one subject had access (4 trials 185 
for each). We are aware that during this training session, chimpanzees experienced more trials where 186 
they had to pull compared to trials where they did not pull. However, we wanted chimpanzees to 187 
experience the three potential outcomes that they could face during the test sessions (pull alone, pull 188 
together and not pull). Each training condition included two short trials where the food remained for 10 189 
seconds and two long trials where the food remained for 40 seconds.  In this training each subject 190 
experienced four trials pulling together with the partner, four pulling alone to obtain the reward and 191 
four not pulling but getting a reward. We could not control the pulling side as in the individual training 192 
because the chimpanzees were free to move between sides although we controlled the amount of trials 193 
per condition that each chimpanzee pulled by waiting until both chimpanzees were positioned in front 194 
of the apparatus.  195 
 196 
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Test sessions 197 
Each dyad performed eight test sessions: four heavy weight sessions (mean weight of tray = 70.64 kg) 198 
and four light weight sessions (X = 26.96 kg). Each session consisted of 8 trials: four long trials, in which 199 
the food rewards were available for 40 seconds and four short trials in which the food was available for 200 
10 seconds before falling off the tray. Chimpanzees could differentiate conditions once the trial started. 201 
In long trials the food was stationary until the last 10 seconds when it moved towards the end of the 202 
tray. In short trials the food started to move when the trial started. As the subjects were free to move 203 
between the sides of the apparatus, we could not counterbalance their positions at the beginning of 204 
each trial. 205 
Prior to each test session subjects were given two individual trials to experience the weight they were 206 
going to face in the subsequent session (on the same day). These trials served to inform the subjects 207 
about the weight they would face in the following test session and to be sure they could move the 208 
weight alone. Although it was not possible to visually detect weight differences in the apparatus, we 209 
expected subjects to rely on the information provided in these two trials to make decisions in the test 210 
trials. These trials were the same as in the individual training.   211 
Coding 212 
We measured the outcome of chimpanzees’ actions (success/failure), the weight each partner pulled, 213 
and the timing of pulling. To evaluate all possible instances of cooperation we calculated a “measure of 214 
equality” (ME) based on the weight pulled by both subjects on a given trial. To measure the ME we 215 
calculated the average of the weights (higher than 1.5 kg) shown on the scales while the subjects were 216 
pulling from their ropes. We then divided the difference between averages of the two subjects by the 217 
sum of both averages. Therefore, we obtained a “measure of equality” (ME), ranging from -1 to 1.  We 218 
transformed all of the values to positive values for analysis. Thus, an ME of 1 indicated perfect 219 
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cooperation (subjects pulled an equal weight) while 0 indicated complete free-riding (only one individual 220 
pulled; see Appendix for further details). Importantly, by using this measure, we could identify the exact 221 
degree of cooperation (the investment by each subject).  To assess whether subjects waited for a 222 
partner to pull we recorded the time between the start of the trial and the first subject of the dyad to 223 
pull. This was possible as we recorded all sessions with digital cameras and we could calculate times up 224 
to 1/25 of a second (see Appendix for further details).  We analysed whether the subjects that were 225 
tested in two pairs (N=10) changed their behaviour (based on the weight moved) with different 226 
partners. The inter-observer agreement was excellent based on the 15% of the data (R2 = 0.99) and 227 
latencies (R2 = 0.94). 228 
In a post-hoc analysis we investigated whether the partners’ previous actions had an effect on the 229 
subject’s likelihood to pull on a subsequent trial. To do so, we constructed a predictor based on the 230 
number of trials in which the subject’s partner had pulled within a particular session, prior to the 231 
subject’s action in a given trial. For example, on trial 8 of the session the partner could have pulled from 232 
0 to 7 times. Importantly, we did not take into account the first trial of each session as there was no 233 
previous experience.  234 
Ethical note 235 
The study was ethically approved by an internal committee at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary 236 
Anthropology. Animal husbandry and research comply with the “EAZA Minimum Standards for the 237 
Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos and Aquaria”, the “WAZA Ethical Guidelines for the 238 
Conduct of Research on Animals by Zoos and Aquariums” and the “Guidelines for the Treatment of 239 
Animals in Behavioural Research and Teaching” of the Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. 240 
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RESULTS 242 
Overall, chimpanzee pairs coordinated their actions and obtained the food in 96.7% of trials.  243 
Chimpanzees showed evidence of minimising their costs. In high weight sessions, chimpanzees waited 244 
longer to pull across trials while they decreased their latency to pull across trials in low weight sessions 245 
(Model 1; LMM: 21 = 6.127, N = 586, P = 0.013, CI [-0.195, -0.022]; Fig. 2a).  Rather than being strategic 246 
this finding could be a result of subjects getting tired in later trials. However, they did not show this 247 
latency difference between high and low weight trials during the experience trials prior to the test when 248 
there was no partner present (Model 2; LMM: 22 = 1.265, N = 166, P = 0.26). Moreover, when we 249 
analysed the total time that chimpanzees spent pulling, they decreased their time during the last trials 250 
of high weight sessions (Model 3; LMM: 21 = 10.76, N = 586, P = 0.001, CI [-0.103, -0.021]; Fig. 2b) further 251 
suggesting that waiting was strategic and not a consequence of fatigue.  252 
However, despite indications of strategic behaviour, we found that pulling together (i.e. a ME > 0) was 253 
the dominant strategy to solve the task: 60% trials in low weight and 79% in high weight. We found that 254 
pulling together tended to increase across high weight sessions although the result was not significant, 255 
.518, N = 702, P = 0.06, CI [-1.911, -0.108]; Fig. 2c), which suggests that dyads 256 
tended to cooperate more often when the effort was high. We report and plot this result as it is an 257 
interesting trend in the opposite direction we predicted, suggesting that chimpanzees cooperated more 258 
often in high weight trials. 259 
While pulling together was common, the effort invested by individuals was often unequal (XME= 0.58) 260 
with no significant effects of weight condition on session, trial or type of trials (Model 5; LMM: 28 = 261 
9.716, N = 490, P = 0.286). However, the percentage of weight pulled by the first puller increased across 262 
sessions in the high weight condition (Model 6; LMM: 21 = 
7.252, N = 478, P = 0.007, CI [-0.103, -0.021]; 263 
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Fig. 2d) and the percentage of the total weight pulled by the first puller was always greater than 50%. 264 
This indicates that being the first to act is more costly, and this cost differential increases with 265 
experience.  266 
 267 
Interestingly, the length of the trial neither influenced the timing of their decisions nor their likelihood 268 
to cooperate, suggesting that it was mainly the effort and not the time pressure that influenced the 269 
subject’s actions. Phase (1 or 2) did not have a systematic effect in any of our models, suggesting that 270 
previous experience with another subject did not influence the subjects’ performance with another 271 
partner. However, subjects did change their behaviour between phases: they significantly varied in their 272 
effort (46% of difference in weight moved) between partners (Model 7; LMM: X=45.89, CI [27.84, 273 
63.56]) suggesting that chimpanzees did not act in the same way when they were paired with different 274 
partners. Figure 3 shows that the pulling latencies of the subjects overlap suggesting that individual 275 
differences in pulling latency do not fully explain the differences observed in pulling effort between 276 
subjects (see Appendix for details).  277 
Our post-hoc analysis on the pulling probability as a function of the previous proportion of partner pulls 278 
within a session revealed no significant effect (Model 8; GLMM: 28 = 6.202, N = 1228, P =0.4) neither in 279 
high nor in low weight conditions, suggesting that chimpanzees did not take into account their partners’ 280 
previous decisions to pull when deciding whether to pull or not in a subsequent trial. 281 
DISCUSSION 282 
In a task where chimpanzees could potentially free-ride and benefit from their partner’s actions, dyads 283 
solved the coordination problem by pulling together, with a tendency to pull more often together when 284 
those costs were high. However, there were also indications that chimpanzees acted strategically to 285 
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minimize their effort: they were more likely to wait longer to pull at the end of high weight sessions and 286 
the effort invested by first and second puller was imbalanced. Therefore, although chimpanzees did not 287 
free-ride (by not pulling at all) more in high weight conditions as we predicted, they did it so in more 288 
subtle ways, by investing unequal efforts. Chimpanzees also differed significantly in the effort they 289 
invested when tested with different partners.  290 
Previous studies established that chimpanzees cooperate when it is either the only option to get food 291 
(Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2009) or the option that produces the largest food payoff (Duguid et 292 
al., 2014; Bullinger et al., 2011). Here we have shown that chimpanzees cooperate even when there is 293 
the option to free-ride. One possible explanation for this outcome is that they do not know that they 294 
could free-ride and get the food without pulling because they were trained to pull individually.  This 295 
means that when they were paired with a partner, they continued to pull as they had done in the past. 296 
However, all subjects had experienced that food could be obtained without pulling during the dyadic 297 
training. Recall that these subjects experienced receiving food after a partner pulled and they just 298 
waited. Moreover, they also experienced pulling and a partner benefiting from the food without them 299 
pulling at all. However, to train subjects equally on all outcomes, they experienced more trials where it 300 
was necessary to pull compared to trials where they obtained the food without pulling. Thus, it is 301 
possible that this effect could have influenced their likelihood to pull.  302 
Alternatively, it could be that some chimpanzees were just pulling to obtain the food regardless of the 303 
effort and the partners’ presence. But if this were true we would not expect to find differences in their 304 
latency to pull between conditions. On the contrary, subjects behaved strategically when pulling high 305 
weights. Moreover, we would not expect that cooperation tended to increase across sessions when 306 
subjects had already experienced in the dyadic training that they could obtain food without pulling, but 307 
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it increased over time in that condition suggesting that subjects cooperated depending on the effort 308 
they were required to contribute and their prior experience.  309 
The chimpanzees showed further evidence of minimising their costs: they waited longer for their 310 
partner to pull during high weight sessions in which the difference in weight moved between first and 311 
second puller increased across sessions. Increased waiting and high levels of cooperation could be a 312 
result of subjects trying to avoid being the first to pull because a) initiating the movement of the tray 313 
required more pulling effort and b) by pulling second there was no risk of their partner free-riding.  As 314 
has been already discussed, fatigue seemed not to affect their responses. Therefore subjects were not 315 
simply cooperating to share the effort but acted to obtain the rewards and avoid the costs.  316 
A more plausible explanation for the high levels of cooperation observed here could be related to the 317 
amount of experience with the task; subjects learned that by pulling simultaneously the task became 318 
easier and therefore, they continued to pull simultaneously until the end of the study. This would have 319 
been especially salient during the high weight condition in which cooperation tended to increase across 320 
sessions. The perception of weight reduction driven by its division should have been the same in both 321 
conditions (the same proportion between the total weight and the divided weight). However, due to the 322 
fact that low weight trials were already easier to perform for all individuals, it is possible that the 323 
division of weight in high weight trials would have been more salient for the chimpanzees. Additionally, 324 
social facilitation could have contributed to maintain a high level of cooperation. Seeing another 325 
chimpanzee pulling led them to pull thus making free-riding less likely (Galloway, Addessi, Fragaszy & 326 
Visalberghi, 2005). Finally, it is also possible that the high rate of cooperation that we found were due to 327 
the high degree of tolerance between the members of the dyads selected for the study (Hare et al., 328 
2007). This suggestion needs to be corroborated by further studies testing dyads that differ significantly 329 
in their affiliative relationship. 330 
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Contrary to our expectations, time played no crucial role. It is possible that the trial duration was too 331 
long (10s or 40s) to influence subjects’ decisions, which were made quickly (mean time to start pulling = 332 
0.84s), so there was never any real time pressure despite the salient movement of the dishes. Future 333 
studies could investigate whether shorter trial durations influence subjects’ responses. Prior to the start 334 
of the session subjects could not visually assess the pulling effort required to obtain the rewards but 335 
they could experience it at the very first trial of the session and they experienced the same weight in the 336 
individual trials just before the test session. Although the pre-test trials were designed to provide this 337 
information to the subject and the weights used for each session did not change between the pre-test 338 
trials and the test session, it is possible that some subjects did not use this information. It is still an open 339 
question whether enabling subjects to explicitly see the different weights involved before engaging with 340 
the task might elicit more strategic behaviour. 341 
Although chimpanzees mainly cooperated, they differed in the effort they invested when they were 342 
tested with different partners. Based on the median latencies of each subject when pulling, all 343 
chimpanzee dyads except one initiated their pulling at similar latencies. This result suggests that 344 
variation in the amount of weight invested between partners can be better explained by subjects taking 345 
into account and adjusting to their partner’s behaviour rather than individual variation in latencies to 346 
pull (e.g. having quick and slow subjects). Our results are in line with previous evidence which show that 347 
chimpanzees can differentiate between their partner’s behaviour in cooperative tasks (Melis et al., 348 
2006; Engelmann & Herrmann, 2016).  349 
We found that a partner’s previous decisions did not have an effect on a subject’s likelihood to pull, 350 
suggesting that chimpanzees were not taking into account their partner’s previous responses to decide 351 
whether to pull in a given trial. One possible explanation is that chimpanzees only took into account 352 
their partner’s current actions, not their past actions. However, their partner’s previous responses are 353 
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not the only information subjects could have used to make their decisions. Their own previous actions as 354 
well as the quantity of effort that their partners had invested could have also contributed to their 355 
decisions.  Alternatively, assuming that they were averse to the risk of losing the rewards, chimpanzees 356 
preferred to secure their rewards (by pulling), with the option to adjust how much they pulled. 357 
Moreover, chimpanzees also showed signs of strategic decision-making as they waited longer to pull 358 
across trials of high weight sessions.  Therefore, only in cases where the partners would have been 359 
highly reliable, would we expected chimpanzees not to pull and thus completely free-ride as we initially 360 
expected. This result helps to explain why they acted strategically by waiting and pulling less weight as 361 
second pullers, while still cooperating frequently.  362 
When we compared the strategies used by chimpanzees in this study to those human adults employ 363 
when they are presented with a snowdrift game, we find that chimpanzees, despite responding flexibly 364 
when paired with different partners, do not take into account partner’s last actions whereas humans 365 
use flexible strategies such as tit-for-tat or Pavlov (Kümmerli et al., 2007). These differences could be 366 
due to chimpanzees’ aversion to the loss of food rewards (as ultimately one member of the dyad pulled 367 
and secured the rewards despite the partner’s action) or due to methodological reasons. In fact, human 368 
studies are difficult to directly compare with our task because human subjects are usually paired with 369 
partners who they do not know or see, they experience real losses, and they cannot decide how much 370 
they can invest in the cooperative act as it is generally a binary decision.  In contrast, chimpanzees in our 371 
study lived in the same group, experienced the loss of potential gains, and were able to decide how 372 
much effort they invested in pulling. Future studies are required to compare how non-human primates 373 
and developmentally matched human controls behave when presented with the same version of the 374 
snowdrift game. 375 
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Overall, we found that chimpanzees pulled together in most trials (70%) although it was not strictly 376 
necessary to get the food. These results are interesting because they are similar to other studies where 377 
chimpanzees must cooperate to retrieve their food rewards (Hirata & Fuwa, 2006; Melis et al., 2006, 378 
2009). In a cooperative task where subjects faced conflict situation (Melis et al., 2009) cooperation 379 
decreased when pairs of chimpanzees pulled for unequal rewards between them, but still were able to 380 
cooperate in approximately half of the trials (45%). In the current task, chimpanzees pulled together in a 381 
greater proportion of the trials but minimised the costs in the high weight condition (the pulling effort 382 
was not the same for each subject). In contrast to Melis et al. (2009), in our task cooperation was not 383 
required to obtain the rewards but they still pulled together.  384 
Moreover, Bullinger et al. (2011) found that chimpanzees preferred to work alone rather than with a 385 
partner to obtain the same rewards in a cooperative task. In contrast, we found that chimpanzees, 386 
despite having the option to work alone (by only one subject pulling), often still preferred to pull with 387 
their partner rather than free-ride to obtain the same rewards. Perhaps the difference between both 388 
studies is that in our task both chimpanzees interact with the same apparatus and therefore social 389 
facilitation in combination with the uncertainty of losing rewards if no one pulls, could have helped to 390 
maintain the high levels of cooperation we found. In Bullinger et al. (2011) the subject had a clear 391 
alternative to work alone and completely avoid the risk of defection by the partner (i.e. the partner 392 
refusing to pull). In the current task there is no risk associated with cooperation because chimpanzees 393 
can solve the task alone. However, free-riding comes with a slight risk that no one pulls. Thus 394 
chimpanzees can remove the risk completely by always pulling (and as a consequence increasing their 395 
costs) or they can remove the costs by free-riding and risk losing the rewards if no-one pulls. 396 
Therefore, if a partner is required to access the rewards in a cooperative task and no other solution is 397 
available, chimpanzees cooperate (Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Melis et al., 2009).  When the partner is not 398 
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needed and an individual option providing the same rewards is available, chimpanzees prefer to work 399 
alone (Bullinger et al., 2011), avoiding the risk of defection by the partner in the cooperative task. 400 
However, in our task where cooperation is not necessary to obtain a reward, chimpanzees still 401 
cooperate in many trials. These contradictory results can be reconciled if we consider them in terms of 402 
risk avoidance and cost reduction. In Bullinger et al. (2011) chimpanzees prefer to work alone to avoid 403 
the risk of defection by the partner. In the current study subjects avoid the risk by pulling more often 404 
(and thus cooperating) but reduce costs by waiting for the partner and pulling less.  405 
The aim of the current experiment was to present chimpanzees with the type of decision they would 406 
need to make to coordinate in the wild when conflicts of interest between group members are involved; 407 
as in border patrols (Watts & Mitani, 2001) or group hunting (Boesch, 1994, 2002 although see Gilby et 408 
al., 2015; Tomasello, 2009 for other interpretations). In these situations, some individuals could 409 
potentially reap the benefits of group living without the need to cooperate as long as one or a few 410 
others pay the costs (e.g. being the first to start the chase or defend the boundaries of the group range).  411 
Moreover, in these situations each subject can potentially adjust their degree of investment and 412 
minimise costs while maintaining successful coordination as we have observed in this study. 413 
Nevertheless, we are aware that our version of the snowdrift game is a simplified version of real life 414 
situations. The main difference is that we apply a 2-person version of the snowdrift game (Sudgen, 415 
1986) while chimpanzee hunting (or border patrol) involves usually more than two individuals, and could 416 
thus be interpreted as a collective action problem (Kitchen & Beehner, 2007; Nunn, 2000). Some 417 
evidence (Schneider et al., 2012) suggests that chimpanzees can solve a collective action problem 418 
although it is still not clear whether individuals that started the action are motivated to help their 419 
partners (acting as volunteers) or rather due to the higher probabilities to obtain a valuable reward 420 
despite performing the action. In fact, dominant individuals resulted in active volunteers presumably 421 
because they could obtain the majority of the rewards after volunteering  422 
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In summary, in a task where free-riding was possible, subjects chose to cooperate in most trials, though 423 
there were indications of strategic behaviour.  Chimpanzees are capable of cooperating in some 424 
situations involving a conflict of interest by managing the trade-off between maintaining successful 425 
coordination within the time limits and minimising costs.  426 
 427 
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Appendix 548 
Apparatus characteristics 549 
Chimpanzees pulled in a tray attached to a central weight. The weight was created by the friction of a 550 
pair of brakes connected to a training-bike wheel (23 cm of diameter). The brakes could be adjusted by 551 
the experimenter thereby adjusting the effort that was needed to move the wheel. 552 
The apparatus consisted on a tray (54.5 X 24 cm) positioned on a fixed table (62.5x50 cm). A pair of 553 
ropes was connected to the tray. Chimpanzees could pull the ropes and move the tray towards the mesh 554 
(movement 1 in Fig. A1).  555 
The food was placed on two small dishes (10x10 cm). These dishes could be moved towards the end of 556 
the apparatus (at which the food became unavailable) by pulling from a wire that the experimenter 557 
controlled (movement 2 in Fig. A2). See figures A1 and A2 for clarification of the apparatus 558 
characteristics. 559 
We used a metallic barrier (10X194X109 cm) to separate subjects inside the testing room. This barrier 560 
was perpendicular to the frontal mesh of the apes’ enclosure. With the barrier, both apes were semi-561 
separated so that chimpanzees could not go directly from one side of the room to the other and they 562 
could not reach the partners’ rewards. 563 
Coding 564 
In this study we measured two variables: the timing of the decisions to pull and the outcomes of apes’ 565 
actions.  566 
The timing was measured from the time the bananas were baited (when chimpanzees were not pulling 567 
while we baited the dishes and the peg was already released) or alternatively, when the peg was 568 
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detached until the first subject started to pull (when chimpanzees were already pulling before the food 569 
was baited). We calculated this latency counting the frames (25 fps) until a number equal or higher than 570 
1.5 kg was shown in the scale. We removed the weights below 1.5 kg to avoid the noise produced when 571 
subjects were just holding the rope and thus only consider instances of active pulling. 572 
To obtain the outcomes measures, we calculated the average of the weights (higher than 1.5 kg) shown 573 
on the scales while the subjects were pulling from their ropes. We then divided the averages difference 574 
between subjects by the sum of both averages. Therefore, we obtained a “measure of equality” (ME), 575 
ranging from -1 to 1.  We transformed all of the values to positive values for analysis (1 - ). For 576 
model 6 we used as a response the percentage of weight that the 1st puller (his average) pulled divided 577 
by  the total weight pulled by both subjects (the sum of their averages).  578 
For model 9 we created an index that took into account all the previous trials within a session that a 579 
partner had pull. The index ranged from 0 (no pull in all previous trials) to 1 (pull in all previous trials). 580 
Model analyses 581 
All analyses were conducted using Linear Mixed models (LMM) and Generalized Linear Mixed Models 582 
(GLMM) (Baayen, Davidson & Bates, 2008) and were run using R statistics (version 3.1.1) and lme4 583 
package (Bates, 2010). We ran all LMM with Gaussian error structure and identity link function and all 584 
GLMM with binomial structure and logit link function. All continuous variables were z-transformed. All 585 
full models were compared to a null model excluding all the test variables. In order to obtain the p-586 
values for the individual fixed effects we conducted likelihood-ratio tests (Barr et al., 2013). 587 
When we analysed the data, one trial was removed due to a problem with the scales and another was 588 
missing due experimenter error. Thus the total number of data points was 702 instead of 704. 589 
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For every model, we assessed model stability by comparing the estimates derived by a model based on 590 
all data with those obtained from models with the levels of the random effects excluded one at a time. 591 
All models were stable. Moreover, to rule out collinearity we checked Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 592 
(Field, 2005). All VIF values were closer to 1 (maximum VIF across all models = 1.189). In linear mixed 593 
models is not possible to obtain effect sizes for each predictor. It is only possible to report size effects 594 
for the effect sizes as a whole (or fixed and random effects together). We consider these general effect 595 
sizes not informative for the purpose of this study and therefore we do not report them.  596 
Models 597 
Model 1. Waiting time before pulling (LMM) 598 
Model 1 investigated the length of time subjects waited before acting. In this model we included only 599 
the trials were both subjects waited before we released the security peg (N = 586). The response was 600 
the time (in seconds) that subjects waited before start pulling. We expected subjects to minimise their 601 
own effort by waiting longer in high weight than in low weight conditions and that this strategy could 602 
increase across trials and sessions. We also expected the type of trial to influence in the subjects waiting 603 
time, decreasing their time when in short time trials. We included phase to test whether subjects would 604 
wait more in phase 2 due to their previous experience in the task (during phase 1). The full model 605 
included the test variables weight condition, type of trial, session, trial and phase as well as the 606 
interactions: type of trial, session and trial, each with weight condition. The control variables were: sex 607 
of the dyad as fixed effect; subject and dyad as random effects and the random slopes.   The full model 608 
including all random slopes did not converge, therefore we checked for random slopes that had a 609 
minimal effect and we removed them (see Table A2).The comparison between the full and the null 610 
model was significant GLMM: 2
8
 = 17.004, P = 0.03, N= 586). We dropped the two non-significant 611 
interactions from the model: weight condition*type of trial (LMM: 2
1
 = 0.066, P = 0.797, N = 586) and 612 
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weight condition*session number (LMM: 2
1
 = 0.556, P = 0.456, N = 586). We found a significant 613 
interaction between weight condition*trial: subjects waited longer to pull at the end of high weight 614 
sessions (see Table A3). 615 
Plotting the overall latencies of each subject (Fig. 3) suggests that the differences we see between 616 
partners could not only be explained by individual differences in pulling latencies. However, the dyad 617 
Robert-Riet differed in their overall pulling latencies. In this dyad could be that one subject (Riet) never 618 
had the opportunity to pull, casting doubt on whether she actively decided to act differently between 619 
subjects or the effects were driven by her slow reactions when pulling. In the rest of dyads (N=9) there 620 
were no overall latency differences. 621 
Model 2. Waiting time before pulling in pre-test trials (LMM) 622 
Model 2 investigated whether subjects differed in their waiting time (measured in seconds) between 623 
weight conditions when they were participating in the pre-test trials. The response was the time (in 624 
seconds) that subjects waited before start pulling in the pre-test trials. This test was conducted to 625 
determine whether subjects were influenced by the weight condition when no partner was present. We 626 
hypothesize that subjects will not differ in their latency between weight conditions in those situations. 627 
We only took into account the second trial of each pair of experience trials before the start of the test 628 
session. The full model included weight condition and session as test variables; sex of the individuals as 629 
fixed effect; subject, partner and dyad as random effects and the random slopes (see Table A2). The 630 
comparison between the full and the null model was not significant (GLMM: 2
2
 = 1.265, P = 0.26, N = 631 
166) suggesting that subjects did not differ between weight conditions when they were alone (see Table 632 
A4). 633 
Model 3. Time spent pulling by at least one subject, after wait (LMM) 634 
Model 3 investigated the time that subjects spent pulling on the rope within a trial, either individually or 635 
simultaneously. In this model we included only the trials were both subjects waited before we released 636 
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the security peg (N = 586). As a response variable we used the total time (measured in seconds) from 637 
the moment they started to pull until one chimpanzee touched a piece of banana.   If chimpanzees were 638 
getting tired across the trials of a high weight session, we would expect them to pull more slowly 639 
towards end of the sessions. We would expect them to pull faster in low weight trials overall and to not 640 
change their time spent pulling within a session. The full model included the test variables weight 641 
condition, type of trial, session and trial as well as the interactions: type of trial, session and trial, each 642 
with weight condition. The control variables were phase and sex of the dyad as fixed effects; subject and 643 
dyad as random effects and the random slopes (see Table A2).  The comparison between the full and the 644 
null model was significant (LMM: 2
8
 = 32.73, P < 0.0001, N = 586). We dropped the two non-significant 645 
interactions from the model: weight condition*type of trial (LMM: 2
1
 = 2.177, P = 0.14, N = 586) and 646 
weight condition*session number (LMM: 2
1
 = 0.013, P = 0.909, N = 586). We found a significant 647 
interaction between weight condition*trial suggesting that subjects got slightly faster across high weight 648 
sessions (See Table A5). 649 
Model 4. Likelihood to cooperate (GLMM) 650 
Model 4 investigated the each dyad’s likelihood to pull together. In this model we included all the data 651 
(N = 702). We transform our response (ME) into a binomial response where 1 meant both pulling and 0 652 
meant that only one subject pulled. We expected cooperation to increase across trials and/or sessions. 653 
We expected subjects to pull together more often in high weight trials. We also expected the type of 654 
trial to influence subjects in their likelihood to pull together, pulling together more often in short time 655 
trials. We included phase to test whether subjects would cooperate more in phase 2 due to their 656 
previous experience in the task (during phase 1). The full model included the test variables weight 657 
condition, type of trial, session, trial and phase as well as the interactions: type of trial, session and trial, 658 
each with weight condition. The control variables were: sex of the dyad and the total time until the 659 
subjects touches the reward as fixed effect; subject and dyad as random effects and the random slopes 660 
(see Table A2). The comparison between the full and the null model was marginally significant (GLMM: 661 

2
8
 = 13.457, P = 0.097, N = 702). Therefore, due to the observed trend (p< 0.1) we inspected how the 662 
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test variables contributed to the response.  We dropped the two non-significant interactions from the 663 
model: weight condition*type of trial (GLMM: 2
1
 = 0.314, P = 0.575, N = 702) and weight condition*trial 664 
number (GLMM: 2
1
 = 0.106, P = 0.745, N = 702).  We found an almost significant interaction between 665 
these two variables suggesting that subjects pulled together more often during the last high weight 666 
sessions (see Table A6).  667 
Model 5. Degree of cooperation (LMM) 668 
Model 5 investigated the dyad’s degree of cooperation. The response of the model was the ME (see 669 
coding section above). In the model we only take into account the dyads pulled together (N = 490). We 670 
expected subjects to cooperate more in high weight condition (especially in short time trials were the 671 
risk of losing the reward were higher). At the same time we expected cooperation to increase across 672 
sessions and/or trials in high weight trials as a consequence of experience pulling together. In contrast, 673 
in low weight trials we expected subjects not to coordinate that often as they could easily pull alone.  674 
The full model included the test variables weight condition, type of trial, session, trial and phase as well 675 
as the interactions: type of trial, session and trial, each with weight condition. The control variables 676 
were: sex of the dyad as fixed effect and subject and dyad as random effects. The random slopes of this 677 
model and the subsequent models are described in Table A2.  The comparison between the full and the 678 
null model was not significant (LMM: 
2
8 = 9.716, P = 0.286, N = 490) indicating that the test variables did 679 
not significantly contribute to the subjects degree of cooperation (see Table A7). 680 
Model 6. Difference in weight between 1st and 2nd puller (LMM) 681 
Model 6 investigated the percentage of the total weight pulled by the first puller (excluding trials in 682 
which only the first subject pulled (N = 212) and trials where both subjects pulled at the same time (N = 683 
12). The response was the percentage of weight pulled by the first puller. We expected that the first 684 
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puller would pull a higher weight than the second puller. Moreover, despite pulling together more in the 685 
high weight condition, we expect that the differences between both subjects might increase across high 686 
weight sessions because subjects would increasingly try to avoid pulling first (the most costly). The full 687 
model included the test variables weight condition, type of trial, session, trial and phase as well as the 688 
interactions: type of trial, session and trial, each with weight condition. The control variables were: sex 689 
of the dyad, phase, type of trial, trial and session as fixed effects; subject and dyad as random effects 690 
and the random slopes (see Table A2). The comparison between the full and the null model was 691 
significant (LMM: 2
4
 = 10.268, P = 0.031, N = 478). We dropped the two non-significant interactions from 692 
the model: weight condition*type of trial (LMM: 2
1
 = 1.074, P = 0.3, N = 478) and weight condition*trial 693 
number (LMM: 2
1
 = 0.0009, P = 0.976, N = 478). We found a significant interaction between weight 694 
condition*session: the 1st puller pulled more weight in later sessions of the high weight (see Table A8). 695 
Differences between model 5 and model 6 696 
These two models, despite answering similar questions differ substantially in their response. Model 5 is 697 
not directional and measures the equality of cooperation between both individuals pulling while Model 698 
6 is directional as it takes the percentage of the total weight pulled by the 1st puller compared to the 2nd 699 
puller as the response, answering the specific question of how much weight was pulled by the subject 700 
that initiated the action compared to the subject that lagged behind. We ran Model 3 in order to assess 701 
whether there was indeed a cost to being the first puller. 702 
Model 7. Difference in weight pulled regarding the partners (LMM) 703 
Model 7 investigated whether subjects performed differently (with regard to the average weight pulled) 704 
with the two partners they were tested with. As a response we used the difference in weight that the 705 
subjects moved when they were paired with different partners. To calculate the response we previously 706 
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calculated the total average weight that each subject moved across all sessions with a specific partner 707 
and then the difference between those average values. Therefore we obtained 20 responses; each was 708 
the difference in weight for the subject’s response between the two partners for each condition. The full 709 
model included weight condition as fixed factor and subject as random effect. The comparison between 710 
the full and the null model was not significant (GLMM: 2
1
 = 0.268, P = 0.605, N = 20). Moreover, we 711 
investigated whether there was a general tendency, regardless of the condition, for subject’s differing in 712 
their average pulled weight when confronted with different partners. Due to the nature of GLMM we 713 
were unable to calculate the p-value to accompany the results. Instead, we use a bootstrapping 714 
(boot.glm function) to calculate the CI. We see that subject’s rates of pulled weight differed significantly 715 
from 0 (no difference in subject’s response in relation to weight between different partners) (X = 45.77, 716 
CI [28.92, 63.12]) suggesting that they were moving significantly different amounts of weight when they 717 
were paired with different partners. 718 
Model 8. Previous experience effect on cooperation in subsequent trials (GLMM). 719 
Model 8 investigated whether subjects’ probability of the subject to pull was influenced by the partners’ 720 
previous decisions to pull within a session.  In this model we excluded the first trial of each session, as 721 
subjects had no previous experience before that trial. Therefore, we only used data were subjects had 722 
previous experience with a partner. As a response we used the ME index. We expected that the 723 
likelihood to pull would have been constant regardless of the partners’ previous decisions to pull. 724 
However, in the extreme cases where the partners would have been very reliable, we would have 725 
expected subjects to pull less. We also expected the type of trial to influence subjects’ likelihood to pull, 726 
pulling more often in short time trials in order to secure the rewards. The full model included the test 727 
variables, weight condition, type of trial, session, trial and phase as well as the interactions: type of trial, 728 
session, trial and previous experience each with weight condition. The control variables were: sex of the 729 
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dyad, phase, type of trial, trial, session and the total time until the subjects touches the reward as fixed 730 
effect; subject and dyad as random effects and the random slopes (see Table A2). The comparison 731 
between the full and the null model was non-significant (GLMM: 
2
8
 = 6.202, P = 0.4, N = 1228) (see Table 732 
A9).  733 
Model 9. Likelihood to wait before pulling (GLMM) 734 
Model 9 investigated the subject’s likelihood to wait or not before pulling. In this model we included all 735 
the data (N = 702). We transformed the response (latency in seconds) into a binomial response (wait 736 
and not wait). We expected that subjects would wait more often in high weight than in low weight and 737 
that the proportion of times that subjects waited would increase across trials and sessions. The full 738 
model included the test variables weight condition, type of trial, session, trial and phase as well as the 739 
interactions: type of trial, session and trial, each with weight condition. The control variables were: sex 740 
of the dyad as fixed effect; subject and dyad as random effects and the random slopes (see Table A2). 741 
The comparison between the full and the null model was not significant (GLMM: 2
8
 = 7.374, P = 0.497, N 742 
= 702) indicating that the test variables did not significantly contribute to the subjects likelihood to wait 743 
(see Table A10). 744 
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Table 1 769 
Models conducted in the study (LMM: linear mixed model; GLMM: generalized linear mixed model. 770 
Random slopes are shown in the Appendix Table A2. 771 
Models Type Response Fixed factors Random effects 
1 LMM Latency to pull 
Condition (low and high weight), session (1-8), trial (1-8), 
type of trial (short-long trials), phase (1-2) and sex of the 
dyad (male, female or mix) 
Dyad and subject 
2 LMM Latency in precondition trials 
Condition (low and high weight), session (1-8) and sex of 
individual (male, female) 
Subject, partner and dyad 
3 LMM Time spent pulling 
Condition (low and high weight), session (1-8), trial (1-8), 
type of trial (short-long trials), phase (1-2) and sex of the 
dyad (male, female or mix) 
Dyad and subject 
4 GLMM Pull together or not 
Condition (low and high weight), session (1-8), trial (1-8), 
type of trial (short-long trials), phase (1-2), total time of 
trial and sex of the dyad (male, female or mix) 
Dyad and subject 
5 LMM  Weight ratio 
Condition (low and high weight), session (1-8), trial (1-8), 
type of trial (short-long trials), phase (1-2) and sex of the 
dyad (male, female or mix) 
Dyad and subject 
6 LMM Proportion of first puller 
Condition (low and high weight), session (1-8), trial (1-8), 
type of trial (short-long trials), phase (1-2) and sex of the 
dyad (male, female or mix) 
Dyad and subject 
7 LMM Inequality in weight between partners Condition (low and high weight) Subject 
8 GLMM  Subject pull  
Condition (low and high weight), session (1-8), trial 91-8), 
type of trial (short-long trials), phase (1-2), total time of 
trial, previous experience and sex of dyad (male, female 
or mix) 
Dyad, subject, partner and 
trial id. 
 772 
 773 
 774 
 775 
 776 
 777 
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Table A1. Subject’s information 778 
Name Sex Age (years) Paired with 
(phase 1) 
Paired with 
(phase 2) 
Relationship 
(phase 1) 
Relationship 
(phase 2) 
Lobo M 10 Kara Kofi Paternal half 
siblings  
Paternal half 
siblings 
Kara F  9 Lobo Sandra Paternal half 
siblings 
Paternal half 
siblings 
Lome M  13 Frodo Robert Paternal half 
siblings 
Father-son 
Robert M  39 Riet Lome Non-kin Father-son 
Frodo M  21 Lome Riet Paternal half 
siblings 
Non-kin 
Kofi M  9 Ulla Lobo Mother-Son Paternal half 
siblings 
Sandra F 21 Tai NA Full siblings  
Tai F 12 Sandra NA Full siblings  
Riet F 37 Robert Frodo Non-kin Non-kin 
Ulla F 34 Kofi Corrie Mother-Son Paternal half 
siblings 
Fraukje F 38 Corrie Kara Non-kin Mother-
daughter 
Corrie F 38 Fraukje Ulla Non-kin Paternal half 
siblings 
Table A2. Model information (below) 779 
38 
Models Type Response Fixed factors Random effects Random slopes 
1 LMM 
 
Latency to 
pull 
Condition (low and 
high weight), session 
(1-8), trial (1-8), type 
of trial (short-long 
trials), phase (1-2) 
and sex of the dyad 
(male, female or mix) 
dyad and subject 
 
Session-dyad, session-subject right, session-subject left, trial-dyad, 
trial-subject right, trial-subject left, condition-dyad, condition-subject 
right, condition-subject left, type of trial-dyad, type of trial-subject 
right, type of trial-subject left, phase-subject right, phase-subject left, 
condition*type of trial-dyad, condition*type of trial-subject right, 
condition*type of trial-subject left, condition*session-dyad, 
condition*session-subject right, condition*session-subject left, 
condition*trial-subject right, condition*trial-subject left 
2 LMM 
Latency in 
precondition 
trials 
Condition (low and 
high weight), session 
(1-8) and sex of 
individual (male, 
female) 
 
subject, partner and 
dyad 
 
Condition-subject, condition-partner, condition-dyad, session-subject, 
session-partner, session-dyad 
3 LMM 
Time spent 
pulling 
Condition (low and 
high weight), session 
(1-8), trial (1-8), type 
of trial (short-long 
trials), phase (1-2) 
and sex of the dyad 
(male, female or mix) 
dyad and subject As in model 1 
4 GLMM 
Pull 
together or 
not 
Condition (low and 
high weight), session 
(1-8), trial (1-8), type 
of trial (short-long 
trials), phase (1-2), 
total time of trial and 
sex of the dyad 
(male, female or mix) 
dyad and subject 
 
 
Session-dyad, session-subject right, session-subject left, trial-dyad, 
trial-subject right, trial-subject left, condition-dyad, condition-subject 
right, condition-subject left, type of trial-dyad, type of trial-subject 
right, type of trial-subject left, phase-subject right, phase-subject left, 
total time trial-dyad, total time trial-subject right, total time trial-
subject left, condition*type of trial-dyad, condition*type of trial-
subject right, condition*type of trial-subject left, condition*session-
dyad, condition*session-subject right, condition*session-subject left, 
condition*trial-subject right, condition*trial-subject left 
5 LMM Weight ratio 
Condition (low and 
high weight), session 
(1-8), trial (1-8), type 
of trial (short-long 
trials), phase (1-2) 
and sex of the dyad 
(male, female or mix) 
dyad and subject As in model 1 
6 LMM 
Proportion 
1st puller 
 
 
Condition (low and 
high weight), session 
(1-8), trial (1-8), type 
of trial (short-long 
trials), phase (1-2) 
and sex of the dyad 
(male, female or mix) 
dyad and subject 
 
As in model 1 
 
7 LMM 
 
Inequality in 
weight 
between 
partners 
Condition (low and 
high weight) 
subject 
 
No random slopes 
 
8 GLMM Subject pull 
Condition (low and 
high weight), session 
(1-8), trial 91-8), type 
of trial (short-long 
trials), phase (1-2), 
total time of trial, 
previous experience 
and sex of dyad 
(male, female or mix) 
 
Dyad, subject, 
partner and trial id. 
Phase-subject, phase-partner, previous experience-subject, previous 
experience-partner, previous experience-dyad, type of trial-dyad, type 
of trial-subject, type of trial-partner, session-dyad, session-subject, 
session-partner, condition-dyad, condition-subject, condition-partner, 
trial-dyad, trial-subject, trial-partner, total time-dyad, total time-
subject, total time-partner, condition*session-dyad, 
condition*session-subject, condition*session-partner, condition-
trial*dyad, condition-trial*subject, condition-trial*partner, 
condition*previous experience-dyad, condition*previous experience-
subject, condition*previous experience-partner 
9 
 
GLMM 
Likelihood 
to wait or 
not 
 
Condition (low and 
high weight), session 
(1-8), trial (1-8), type 
of trial (short-long 
trials), phase (1-2) 
and sex of the dyad 
(male, female or mix)  
 
Dyad and subject 
  
 
As in model 1 
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Table A3 780 
Table Model 1 781 
Test category 
(reference 
category) 
Estimate Standard 
Error 
Chi-
square 
Degrees 
of 
freedom 
p-value CI (95%) of the 
reduced model 
Intercept -0.123 0.158 - - - -0.432/0.197 
Phase 0.049 0.099 0.22 1 0.638 -0.123/0.252 
Sex of dyad - - 0.404 2 0.817 - 
Type of trial 
(long) 
-0.034 0.046 0.525 1 0.469 -0.126/0.059 
Session number -0.017 0.054 0.099 1 0.753 -0.122/0.089 
Weight 
condition*trial 
number 
-0.107 0.043 6.127 1 0.013 -0.195/-0.022 
 782 
 783 
 784 
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Table A4 785 
Table Model 2 786 
 787 
 788 
 789 
 790 
 791 
 792 
 793 
 794 
 795 
 796 
 797 
 798 
 799 
 800 
 801 
 802 
Test category (reference 
category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
CI (95%) of the  full 
model 
Intercept 0.919 0.137 0.641/1.189 
Sex of the subject 
(female) 
0.197 0.209 -0.231/-0.655 
Weight condition (low) -0.067 0.059 -0.193/0.056 
session number 0.034 0.029 -0.019/0.091 
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Table A5 803 
Table Model 3 804 
Test category 
(reference 
category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-square 
Degrees 
of 
freedom 
p-value 
CI (95%) of 
the reduced 
model 
Intercept 1.257 0.121 - - - 0.999/1.492 
Phase -0.003 0.076 0.002 1 0.968 -0.142/0.158 
Sex of dyad - - 0.705 2 0.703 - 
Type of trial 
(long) 
0.03 0.043 0.493 1 0.483 -0.054/0.115 
Session 
number 
-0.07 0.032 3.13 1 0.077 
-0.134/-
0.007 
Weight 
condition*trial 
number 
0.119 0.036 10.76 1 0.001 0.047/0.188 
 805 
 806 
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Table A6 807 
Table Model 4 808 
 809 
 810 
Test category 
(reference category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-
square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
p-
value 
CI (95%) of the 
reduced model 
Intercept 3.973 0.786 - - - 2.847/5.417 
Phase 0.543 0.515 0.938 1 0.334 -0.438/1.686 
Total time until they touch 
the reward 
0.562 0.258 3.497 1 0.061 0.114/1.199 
Sex of dyad - - 9.919 2 0.007 - 
Type of trial 
(long) 
-0.199 0.237 0.643 1 0.423 -0.725/0.277 
Trial number -0.283 0.168 1.985 1 0.159 -0.670/0.067 
Weight condition*session 
number 
-0.967 0.437 3.518 1 0.06 -1.911/-0.108 
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Table A7 811 
Table Model 5 812 
 813 
 814 
 815 
 816 
 817 
 818 
Test category Estimate Standard Error CI (95%) of the full model 
Intercept 0.587 0.052 0.470/0.703 
Phase -0.027 0.026 -0.081/0.032 
Sex of dyad - - - 
Weight condition*Type of trial -0.046 0.037 -0.116/0.028 
Weight condition*Trial number 0.024 0.028 -0.024/0.054 
Weight condition*session number 0.017 0.019 -0.03/0.078 
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Table A8 819 
Table Model 6 820 
Test category 
(reference 
category) 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Chi-square 
Degrees 
of 
freedom 
p-value 
CI (95%) of 
the reduced 
model 
Intercept 0. 577 0.0322 - - - 0.513/0.647 
Phase 0.003 0.013 0.06 1 0.807 -0.026/0.032 
Sex of dyad - - 2.139 2 0.343 - 
Type of trial 
(long) 
-0.043 0.025 2.516 1 0.113 -0.089/0.007 
Trial number -0.006 0.017 0.117 1 0.731 -0.042/0.028 
Weight 
condition*session 
number 
-0.065 0.0212 7.252 1 0.007 -0.103/-0.021 
 821 
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Table A9 822 
Table Model 8 823 
 824 
 825 
Test category 
(reference category) 
Estimate Standard Error 
CI (95%) of the 
full model 
Intercept 6.954 1.348 17.668/35.504 
Phase 0.793 0.952 -1.580/ 3.140 
Total time until they touch the reward 0.6 0.421 -0.284/ 3.085 
Sex of dyad NA - - 
Type of trial 
(long) 
-0.028 0.422 -20.926/ -9.498 
Trial number -0.304 0.223 -1.888/ 0.182 
Weight condition (high) -0.313 0.865 -21.029/-9.506 
Session number 0.941 0.722 -0.508/ 3.928 
Previous experience -0.826 1.178 -45.465/-23.530 
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Table A10 826 
Table Model 9 827 
 828 
 829 
 830 
 831 
 832 
 833 
 834 
 835 
 836 
 837 
 838 
 839 
 840 
 841 
 842 
 843 
Test category Estimate Standard Error 
CI (95%) of the full 
model 
Intercept 3.822 0.756 2.648/5.673 
Phase 0.075 -0.332 -0.332/0.507 
Sex of dyad NA - - 
Weight condition*Type of 
trial 
-0.552 0.514 -1.641/0.627 
Weight condition*Trial 
number 
-0.281 0.334 -1.108/0.361 
Weight condition*session 
number 
0.574 0.302 -0.013/1.239 
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Figure captions 844 
Figure 1. Experimental set-up. Both chimpanzees can either pull or not from their ropes to move the 845 
tray and retrieve the rewards. 846 
Figure 2. a) Latency to pull the tray in high and low weight conditions across trials; b) Time spent pulling 847 
the tray in high and low weight condition across trials after starting the action; c) Proportion of trials 848 
that subjects pulled together in high and low weight conditions across sessions and d) Proportion of 849 
weight pulled by the first puller across sessions. The dotted-lines represent the fitted-model and the 850 
coloured areas represent the CI at 95%. 851 
Figure 3. Pulling latencies (s) for all subjects. 852 
Figures A1 Apparatus characteristics 853 
Figure A2 Apparatus characteristics 854 
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Figures 863 
1 864 
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A1 888 
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 890 
 891 
 892 
 893 
 894 
 895 
 896 
 897 
 898 
 899 
A2 900 
 901 
Rectangular tracks 
Scales 
Tray 
Fixed table 
Wire 
Training-
bike wheel 
Movement 2 
Mesh barrier 
partially separating 
both subjects 
Movement 1 
Training-bike wheel 
Brakes 
